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ABSTRACT
Conventional adversarial defenses reduce classification ac-
curacy whether or not a model is under attacks. Moreover,
most of image processing based defenses are defeated due
to the problem of obfuscated gradients. In this paper, we
propose a new adversarial defense which is a defensive trans-
form for both training and test images inspired by perceptual
image encryption methods. The proposed method utilizes a
block-wise pixel shuffling method with a secret key. The ex-
periments are carried out on both adaptive and non-adaptive
maximum-norm bounded white-box attacks while consider-
ing obfuscated gradients. The results show that the proposed
defense achieves high accuracy (91.55 %) on clean images
and (89.66 %) on adversarial examples with noise distance of
8/255 on CIFAR-10 dataset. Thus, the proposed defense out-
performs state-of-the-art adversarial defenses including latent
adversarial training, adversarial training and thermometer
encoding.
Index Terms— Adversarial defense, adversarial machine
learning, perceptual image encryption
1. INTRODUCTION
Security in computer vision systems is quintessential and high
in demand. This is because computer vision technology has
been deployed in many applications including safety and se-
curity critical applications such as self-driving cars, health-
care, facial recognition, etc. and many more visual recogni-
tion systems. Computer vision systems are primarily powered
by deep neural networks (DNNs). It is proven that DNNs have
brought impressive state-of-the-art results to computer vision.
However, researchers have already discovered that neural net-
works in general are vulnerable towards certain alteration in
the input known as adversarial examples [1, 2]. These ad-
versarial examples can cause neural networks misclassify or
force to classify a targeted class with high confidence. In-
correct decisions made by DNNs can cause serious and dan-
gerous problems. As an example, self-driving cars may mis-
classify “Stop” sign as “Speed Limit” [3]. Due to this threat,
adversarial machine learning research has got a significant
amount of attention recently although it has been started over
a decade ago [4].
Researchers have proposed various attacks and defenses.
Ideally, provable robust models are desired. Inspiring works
such as [5–7] proposed provable secure training. Although
these methods are attractive and desirable, they are not avail-
able for larger datasets. One recent work [8] scaled up to
CIFAR-10 [9] dataset in provable defense research. However,
the accuracy is not comparable even on low adversarial noise
distance. There is also an alternative approach to find a defen-
sive transform t(·) so that the prediction of a classifier f(·) on
clean image x is equal to that of an adversarial example x′
(i.e., f(x) = f(t(x′))). Such works include [10–14], etc.
They all have been defeated when accounting for obfuscated
gradients (a way of gradient masking) [15]. To reinforce these
weak defense methods, Raff et al. [16] proposed a stronger
defense by combining a large number of transforms stochas-
tically. However, applying many transforms drop in accuracy
even though the model is not under attack and is computation-
ally expensive. Our previous work removes adversarial noise
generated on one-bit images by double quantization [17], but,
clean images are limited to be in one-bit.
Therefore, in this work, we propose a new adversarial de-
fense which has been inspired by perceptual image encryption
methods [18–21]. It was reported that [20] can be used as a
defensive transform [22]. However, it is not meant for adver-
sarial defense and reduces accuracy. To defend adversarial
examples and maintain high accuracy, we design a defensive
transform that uses a block-wise pixel shuffling method. Sim-
ilar to our work, Taran et al. proposed a key-based adversar-
ial defense [23]. The main intellectual differences include:
(1) the proposed defense is inspired by perceptual image en-
cryption (specifically, block-wise image encryption), in con-
trast to traditional cryptographic methods and (2) we consider
white-box attacks unlike the work by [23] that considered
gray-box attacks. In an experiment, the proposed defense is
confirmed to outperform state-of-the-art adversarial defenses
including latent adversarial training, adversarial training and
thermometer encoding under maximum-norm bounded threat
model with the noise distance of 8/255 on CIFAR-10 dataset.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Adversarial Examples
An adversarial example is a modified input x′ (visually simi-
lar to x) to a classifier f(·) aiming f(x) 6= f(x′). An attacker
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finds perturbation δ under certain distance metric (usually `p
norm) to construct an adversarial example. An attack algo-
rithm usually minimizes the perturbation or maximizes the
loss function, i.e.,
minimize
δ
‖δ‖p , s.t. f(x+ δ) 6= y, or (1)
maximize
δ∈∆
L(f(x+ δ), y), (2)
where ∆ = {δ : ‖δ‖p ≤ }. There are many attack al-
gorithms such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [24],
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [25], Carlini and Wagner
(CW) [26], etc.
2.2. Threat Model
Following [27] and [2], first, we describe a threat model
that we use to evaluate the proposed defense. We deploy
PGD [25] because it is one of the strongest attacks under `∞
norm bounded metric.
Based on the goal of an adversary, the attack can be
whether targeted (f(x′) = z where z is a class targeted by the
adversary) or untargeted (f(x′) 6= y where y is a true class).
We focus on untargeted attacks under ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ , where
 is a given noise distance.
We evaluate the proposed defense in white-box settings.
Therefore, we assume this adversary has full knowledge of
the model, its parameters, trained weights, training data and
the proposed defense mechanism except a secret key.
The adversary performs evasion attacks (i.e., test time at-
tacks) in which small changes under `∞ metric change the
true class of the input. The adversary’s capability is to mod-
ify the test image where the noise distance is  in the range
of [2/255, 32/255]. Having full knowledge of the defense
transform, our adversary also extends PGD. Fully account-
ing obfuscated gradients, the adversary implements an adap-
tive attack like Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation
(BPDA) [15] to estimate the correct gradients with a guessed
key.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
3.1. Overview
The goal of the proposed method is to hold high accuracy
whether or not the model is under adversarial attacks. The
overview of the proposed defense is depicted in Fig. 1. Train-
ing images are transformed by a secret key and a model is
trained by the transformed images. Test images regardless
of being clean images or adversarial examples are also trans-
formed with the same key before classification process by the
model.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed defense.
3.2. Defensive Transform
We introduce a transform that exploits block-wise pixel shuf-
fling with a secret key as an adversarial defense for the first
time. Both training and test images are transformed with a
common key. The transformation process is as follows.
A 3-channel (RGB), 8-bit image with a dimension ofX×
Y × 3 is divided into blocks (with the size of M × M ×
3) where X and Y should be divisible by M . Otherwise,
padding is required.
Let p(i) and n be the pixel value and the number of pixels
in each block (i.e., M ×M × 3), where i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}.
The new pixel value p′(i) is given by
p′(i) = p(α(i)), (3)
where α = [α(0), α(1), . . . , α(n− 2), α(n− 1)] is a random
permutation vector of the integers from 0 to n − 1 generated
by a key K. Fig. 2 illustrates the process of block-wise pixel
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Fig. 2. Process of block-wise pixel shuffling.
shuffling. The process is repeated for all the blocks in the
image.
3.3. Adaptive Attack
As pointed out by [27] and [2], adaptive attacks are neces-
sary in evaluating adversarial defenses. Several recent de-
fenses are defeated by adaptive attacks due to obfuscated gra-
dients [15]. To ensure the strength of the proposed defense,
we implement a BPDA-like attack so that the gradients are
correct with respect to the attacker’s guessed key as shown in
Fig. 3. Basically, the adversary applies block-wise shuffling
to a test image with a key, PGD is run on the shuffled image
and the resulting adversarial example is de-shuffled with the
adversary’s assumed key. We used random keys to attack the
proposed method in our experiments.
3.4. Key Management
The proposed method uses a shared secret key K to all the
blocks in each of both training and test images. Its key space
is defined as follows:
K(n) = n!, (4)
where n is the number of pixels in a block. Deep learning
is often done in the cloud server (provider) and the key K
should be saved securely at the server in deploying the pro-
posed method.
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Fig. 3. Diagram of adaptive attack.
4. EXPERIMENTS
4.1. Setup
We used CIFAR-10 [9] dataset with a batch size of 128 and
live augmentation (random cropping with padding of 4 and
random horizontal flip) on training set. CIFAR-10 consists
of 60,000 color images (dimension of 32 × 32 × 3) with 10
classes (6000 images for each class) where 50,000 images are
for training and 10,000 for testing. Both training and test im-
ages were preprocessed by the proposed method with a com-
mon shared secret key K.
The deep residual network [28] with 18 layers (ResNet18)
was trained for 160 epochs by the stochastic gradient descent
optimizer. The parameters are: momentum of 0.9, weight
decay of 0.0005 and initial learning rate of 0.1. A step learn-
ing rate scheduler was used with the settings (lr steps = 40,
gamma = 0.1).
The parameters of PGD adversary are  in the range of
[2/255, 32/255], and α = 2/255. The attack was run for 20
and 40 iterations with/without random initialization. When
random initializaition is set, perturbation is initialized with
random values bounded by given .
Table 1. Accuracy of the proposed method under the use of
various block sizes on PGD20 ( = 32/255)
M ×M Clean PGD20
2× 2 0.9408 0.7157
4× 4 0.9155 0.8472
8× 8 0.8540 0.7892
16× 16 0.7351 0.6756
We used publicly available ResNet18 implementation [29]
on PyTorch. The proposed method was implemented by mod-
ifying the code base of [20]. We deployed traditional PGD
implementation from [30] and implemented BPDA-like at-
tack to make the adversary adaptive and effective.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. PGD Attack on Various Block Sizes
We evaluated the proposed method under the use of various
block sizes, M ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16} by PGD. We trained ResNet18
with images transformed by the proposed method with differ-
ent block size M ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16} resulting four models. The
trained models were first attacked by PGD with  = 32/255
for 20 iterations (i.e., PGD20) without random initialization.
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained from the experi-
ment of the proposed method. The model trained with trans-
formed images where M = 2 gave the best performance
(94.08 %) when the model is not under attacks. However,
M = 4 performed better under attacks (i.e., 84.72 %). The
results suggest that M = 4 provides the best overall perfor-
mance.
4.2.2. PGD Attack in Various Settings
We further ran PGD attacks with various settings to the model
trained by the proposed defense where M = 4. The attacks
were executed for 20 and 40 iterations, and subscript r de-
notes random initialization (e.g., PGD20r stands for PGD at-
tack for 20 iterations with random initialization and BPDA
denotes the adaptive attack).
Table 2 captures the results of untargeted attacks where
 = 8/255 and 32/255. When  = 8/255, the model
maintain 91.55 % accuracy on clean images and 89.66 % on
BPDA40r attack. This confirms that the adaptive attack can-
not reduce the accuracy when the attacker’s key is not correct.
However, when was increased to 32/255, BPDA40r reduced
the accuracy to 61.60 %.
Our experiments show that BPDA40r is a better adver-
sary. Therefore, we evaluated the proposed defense with
various  ∈ {2/255, 4/255, 8/255, 16/255, 32/255} by
BPDA40r. Moreover, to confirm the effectiveness of the
proposed method, we also implemented state-of-the-art ad-
versarial defense method, i.e., adversarial training (AT) [25]
on the same network specifications with  = 8/255 to com-
pare the results. The accuracy versus various noise distances
is plotted in Fig. 4. When  < 8/255, the model trained
by the proposed defense provides more than 90 % accuracy.
The accuracy gradually drops when  is greater than 8/255.
Specifically, when  = 16/255, the model achieves ≈ 83 %
accuracy. On the worst case scenario (i.e.  = 32/255), the
accuracy of the model is ≈ 62 %. Nevertheless, the proposed
method outperforms AT in any given perturbation budget as
shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. Accuracy vs. perturbation budget.
4.3. Comparison with State-of-the-art Defenses
To confirm the effectiveness of the proposed defense, we
made a comparison with state-of-the-art published defenses
for CIFAR-10 dataset on RobustML catalog1. We compared
the proposed defense with the recent three defenses: latent
adversarial training (LAT) [31], adversarial training (AT) [25]
and thermometer encoding (TE) [10]. All three defenses used
wide residual network [32] and were evaluated on `∞ threat
model with  = 8/255 except LAT (used  = 0.03). Ta-
ble 3 shows the summary of the comparison. The proposed
model was trained on ResNet18 and achieves superior accu-
racy (i.e., 91.55 % on clean images and 89.66 % on attacked
ones). Even on the worst case scenario (i.e.,  = 32/255),
the accuracy of the proposed method was still higher than the
state-of-the-art defenses whether or not the model was under
attacks.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new adversarial defense that
utilizes a key-based block-wise pixel shuffling method as a
defensive transform for the first time. Specifically, both train-
ing and test images are transformed by the proposed method
with a common key before training and testing. We also
1https://www.robust-ml.org/
implemented an adaptive attack to verify the strength of the
proposed defense. Our experiments suggest that the proposed
defense is resistant to both adaptive and non-adaptive attacks.
The results show that the proposed defense achieves higher
accuracy, 91.55 % on clean images and 89.66 % on adver-
sarial examples. Compared to state-of-the-art defenses, the
accuracy of the proposed method is 35.84 % better than latent
adversarial training, 43.66 % than adversarial training and
59.66 % than thermometer encoding under a maximum-norm
bounded white-box threat model with the noise distance of
8/255 on CIFAR-10 dataset.
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